y, which began, in 1804, a policy of rigid naval search for
contraband cargoes, largely carried on off American ports. Whatever
friendly views Pitt may once have entertained toward the Americans, his
Ministry now had for its sole object the contest with {193} France and
the protection of British interests. In July, 1805, a severe blow was
suddenly struck by Sir William Scott, who as chief Admiralty judge
rendered a decision to the effect that French sugar, entered at an
American custom-house and re-exported with a rebate of the duty, was good
prize under the Rule of 1756. This placed all American re-exportation of
French West Indian produce at the mercy of British cruisers; and the
summer of 1805 saw a sudden descent of naval officers upon their prey,
causing an outcry of anger from every seaport between Maine and Maryland.
The day of reckoning had come, and Jefferson and Madison, his Secretary
of State, were compelled to meet the crisis. Fortunately, as it
appeared, for the United States, the Pitt Ministry ended with the death
of its leader on January 23, 1806, and was succeeded by a coalition in
which Lord Grenville, author of the Jay treaty, was prime Minister, and
Fox, an avowed friend of America, was Foreign Secretary. While it was
not reasonably to be expected that any British Ministry would throw over
the traditional naval policy of impressments or venture to run directly
counter to shipping interests, it was open to anticipation that some such
compromise as the Jay treaty might be agreed upon, which would relieve
the United {194} States from arbitrary exactions during the European war.
The Grenville Ministry showed its good intentions by abandoning the
policy of captures authorized by Scott, and substituting, on May 16,
1806, a blockade of the French coast from Ostend to the Seine. This
answered the purpose of hindering trade with France without raising
troublesome questions, and actually allowed American vessels to take
sugar to Northern Europe.

Between 1804 and 1806, Jefferson had brought the United States to the
verge of war with Spain through insisting that Napoleon's cession of
Louisiana had included West Florida. At the moment when British seizures
began, he was attempting at once to frighten Spain by warlike words and,
by a payment of two million dollars, to induce France to compel Spain to
acknowledge the American title to the disputed territory. For a number
of years, therefore, and until the sc