a declaration of war on June 18,
committing the United States to a contest with the greatest naval power
in the world on the grounds of the Orders in Council, the impressment of
seamen, and the intrigues with the north-western Indians. At the moment
when Napoleon, invading Russia, began his last stroke for universal
empire, the United {214} States entered the game as his virtual ally.
This was something the Federalists could not forgive. They returned to
their homes, execrating the war as waged in behalf of the arch-enemy of
God and man, as the result of a pettifogging bit of trickery on the part
of Napoleon. They denounced the ambitions of Clay and the Westerners,
who predicted an easy conquest of Canada, as merely an expression of a
pirate's desire to plunder England of its colonies, and they announced
their purpose to do nothing to assist the unrighteous conflict. In their
anger at Madison, they were even willing to vote for De Witt Clinton of
New York, who ran for President in 1812 as an Independent Republican; and
the coalition carried the electoral vote of every State north of Maryland
except Pennsylvania and Vermont.

When the news of the repeal of the Orders in Council crossed the
Atlantic, some efforts were made by the governor-general of Canada to
arrange an armistice, hoping to prevent hostilities. But Madison does
not seem to have seriously considered abandoning the war, even though the
original cause had been removed. Feeling the irresistible pressure of
the southern and western Democrats behind him, he announced that the
contest must go on until England should {215} abandon the practice of
impressment. So the last hope of peace disappeared.

The war thus begun need never have taken place, had the Tory Ministries
of Portland or Perceval cared to avert it. The United States only lashed
itself into a war-like mood after repeated efforts to secure concessions,
and after years of submission to British rough handling. During all this
time, either Madison or Jefferson would gladly have accepted any sort of
compromise which did not shut American vessels wholly out from some form
of independent trade. But the enmity of the British shipowners and naval
leaders and the traditional British commercial policy joined with
contempt for the spiritless nation to prevent any such action until the
fitting time had gone by.

CHAPTER XI

THE WAR FOR "SAILORS' RIGHTS" AND WESTWARD EXPANSION, 1812-1815

The