th went by and the Perceval Ministry obstinately refused to stir
from its commercial policy.

Yet the feeling of the English public was already undergoing a change.
By 1812 the {212} pretence that the Orders in Council were maintained for
the purpose of starving out France was growing transparent when thousands
of licences, granted freely to British vessels, permitted a vast fleet to
carry on the supposedly forbidden trade. Although Perceval and Canning
still insisted in Parliament that the Orders were retaliatory, the fact
was patent that their only serious effect was to cause the loss of the
American trade and the American market. At the threat of war, the
exporters of England, suffering severely from glutted markets, began a
vigorous agitation against Perceval's policy and bombarded the Ministry,
through Henry Brougham, with petitions, memorials, and motions which put
the Tories on the defensive. Speakers like Alexander Baring held up the
system of Orders in Council as riddled with corruption, and only the
personal authority of Perceval and Castlereagh kept the majority firm.
At the height of this contest, Perceval was assassinated, on May 11,
1812; and it was not until June 8 that hope of a new coalition was
abandoned, and the Tory Cabinet was definitely reorganized under Lord
Liverpool. Almost the first act of that Ministry was to bow before the
storm of petitions, criticisms, and complaints, and to announce on June
16 that they had decided to suspend the Orders. {213} Thus the very
contingency upon which Jefferson and Madison had counted came to pass.
The British government, at the instance of the importing and
manufacturing classes, yielded to the pressure of American commercial
restrictions. It was true that the danger of war weighed far more,
apparently, than the Non-intercourse Act; but had there been an Atlantic
cable, or even a steam transit, at that time, or had the Liverpool
Ministry been formed a little earlier, the years 1807-1812 might have
passed into history as a triumphant vindication of Jefferson's theories.

But it was too late. Madison, seeing, apparently, that his plans were a
failure, fell in with the new majority, and after deliberate preparation
sent a message to Congress in June, 1812, which was practically an
invitation to declare war. In spite of the bitter opposition of all
Federalists and many eastern Republicans, Congress, by the votes of the
southern and western members, adopted