ENCH HELD THE GERMANS WITH THE INSPIRING
SLOGAN "THEY SHALL NOT PASS"

Why did Germany select this particular point for its grand offensive?
The answer is to be found in a demand made by the great Junker
associations of Germany in May, 1915, nine months before the attack was
undertaken. That demand was to the effect that Verdun should be attacked
and captured. They declared that the Verdun fortifications made a
menacing salient thrust into the rich iron fields of the Briey basin.
From this metalliferous field of Lorraine came the ore that supplied
eighty per cent of the steel required for German and Austrian guns and
munitions. These fields of Briey were only twenty miles from the great
guns of Verdun. They were French territory at the beginning of the war
and had been seized by the army of the Crown Prince, co-operating with
the Army of Metz because of their immense value to the Germans in war
making.

As a preliminary to the battle, von Falkenhayn placed a semicircle of
huge howitzers and rifles around the field of Briey. Then assembling the
vast forces drained from all the fronts and having erected ammunition
dumps covering many acres, the great battle commenced with a surprise
attack upon the village of Haumont on February 21, 1916.

The first victory of the Germans at that point was an easy one. The
great fort of Douaumont was the next objective. This was taken on
February 25th after a concentrated bombardment that for intensity
surpassed anything that heretofore had been shown in the war.

Von Falkenhayn, personally superintending the disposition of guns and
men, had now penetrated the outer defenses of Verdun. The tide was
running against the French, and shells, more shells for the guns of all
caliber; men, more men for the earthworks surrounding the devoted city
were needed. The narrow-gauge railway connecting Verdun with the great
French depots of supplies was totally inadequate for the transportation
burdens suddenly cast upon it. In this desperate emergency a transport
system was born of necessity, a system that saved Verdun. It was fleet
upon fleet of motor trucks, all sizes, all styles; anything that could
pack a few shells or a handful of men was utilized. The backbone of the
system was a great fleet of trucks driven by men whose average daily
rest was four hours, and upon whose horizon-blue uniforms the stains of
snow and sleet, of dust and mud, were indelibly fixed through the
winter, spring, sum