the largest stakes.
In most wars, the antagonists have been so nearly equal in point
of personnel and material that the result has seemed to be decided
by the relative degrees of skill of the strategists on both sides.
This has been the verdict of history; and victorious commanders
in all times and in all lands have achieved rarer glories, and
been crowned with higher honors, than any other men.

Preparation strategy deals with the laying out of plans for
supposititious wars and the handling of supposititious forces against
supposititious enemies; and arranges for the construction, equipment,
mobilization, provisioning, fuelling, and moving of supposititious
fleets and armies. War strategy is vivid, stimulating and resultful;
preparation strategy is dull, plodding, and--for the strategist
himself--apparently resultless. Yet war strategy is merely the
child of preparation strategy. The weapons that war strategy uses,
preparation strategy put into its hands. The fundamental plans, the
strength and composition of the forces, the training of officers
and men, the collection of the necessary material of all kinds,
the arrangements for supplies and munitions of all sorts--the very
principles on which war strategy conducts its operations--are the
fruit of the tedious work of preparation strategy. Alexander reaps
the benefit of the preliminary labors of his father, Philip; William
is made German Emperor by the toil of Moltke.

The work of laying out a supposititious campaign, involving
supposititious operations against a supposititious enemy, requires
of the strategist a thorough estimate of the situation, including
a careful estimate of the forces of the enemy, in material and
personnel, and of the strategy that will probably govern his
operations--whether he will act on the defensive, or assume the
offensive; if he is to act on the defensive, how and where will he
base his forces, how far will he operate away from his own shores? And
if he is to act on the offensive, what direction will his operations
take; will he secure an advance base; and if so, where? And as the
character of the enemy's operations will depend on the personnel
of the enemy General Staff and of the high commanders afloat, who
comprise the personnel, and what are their characteristics?

To decide these questions correctly requires considerable acquaintance
with the enemy country, its navy and its policy, a full knowledge
of the strategy, personnel, and