unlike itself or
another, when it becomes like we call it the same--when unlike, other?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite,
and patients many and infinite?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will produce results
which are not the same, but different?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:--There is
Socrates in health, and Socrates sick--Are they like or unlike?
THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and
Socrates in sickness as a whole?
SOCRATES: Exactly; that is my meaning.
THEAETETUS: I answer, they are unlike.
SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and
waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?
THEAETETUS: I should.
SOCRATES: All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly
as he is well or ill.
THEAETETUS: Of course.
SOCRATES: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will
produce something different in each of the two cases?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and
pleasant to me?
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent
meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which
are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the
patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which
arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be
and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.
THEAETETUS: Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.
SOCRATES: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a
different person?
THEAETETUS: Yes.
SOCRATES: The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates
who is sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of
bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in
and about the wine, which becomes not bitterness but something bitter;
as I myself become not perception but percipient?
THEAETETUS: True.
SOCRATES: There is no other object of which I shall ever have the same
perception, for another object would give another perception, and would
make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which
affects me, meeting another s
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