d destroying the bridge over the
Hellespont, but they were voted down by their allies, who preferred
to leave well enough alone.

It is customary to speak of the victory of the Greeks at Salamis
as due to their superior physique and fighting qualities. This
superiority may be claimed for the Greek soldiers at Marathon and
Platae, where the Persian army was actually Persian. The Asiatic
soldier, forced into service and flogged into battle, was indeed
no match for the virile and warlike Greek. But at Salamis it was
literally a case of Greek meeting Greek, except in the case of the
Phoenicians--who had the reputation of being the finest seafighters
in the world--and it is not easy to see how the battle was won by
sheer physical prowess. There is no evidence to show any lack of
either courage or fighting ability on the Persian side. The decisive
feature of the battle was the fatal exposure of the Phoenician wing
at the very outset. However, it is worth noting that the invaders
had been maneuvering all night and were tired--especially the
oarsmen--when called upon to enter battle against an enemy that
was fresh. In that respect there was undoubtedly some advantage
to the Greeks, but it can hardly have been of prime importance.

The immediate results of the victory at Salamis were soon apparent.
The all-conquering Persian army suddenly found itself in a critical
situation. Cut off from its supplies by sea, it had to retreat or
starve, for the country which it occupied was incapable of furnishing
supplies for a host so enormous. Xerxes left an army of occupation in
Thessaly consisting of 300,000 men under Mardonius, but the rest were
ordered to get back to Persia as best they could. A panic-stricken
rout to the Hellespont began, and for the next forty-five days
a great host, that had never been even opposed in battle, went
to pieces under famine, disease, and the guerilla warfare of the
inhabitants of the country it traversed, and it was only a broken
and demoralized remnant of the great army that survived to see the
Hellespont. This great military disaster was due entirely to the
fact that Salamis had deprived Xerxes of the command of the sea.
Indeed, if the advice of Themistodes had been taken and the Greek
fleet had proceeded to the Hellespont and held the position, not even
a remnant of the retreating army would have survived. It happened
that the bridge had been carried away by storms and the army had to
be ferried ove