is remains one of the most brilliant naval
victories in history, a victory won against overwhelming odds by
quick decision and superb audacity.

Only a half century separates Salamis from the battle of the Corinthian
Gulf and the battle of Naupaktis, but during that period there had
been a great advance in naval science.

As far as naval tactics are concerned, Salamis was merely a fight
between two mobs of ships, except that when opportunity offered,
a vessel used her ram. Otherwise the only difference from land
fighting was the fact that the combatants stood on floating platforms.
But in the Peloponnesian war we see not only the birth of naval
tactics but a very high development, especially as revealed in
these two victories of Phormio.

With the development of a naval science rose also a naval profession.
At Salamis Themistocles was a politician and Eurybiades was a soldier;
it happened that they were made fleet commanders for the emergency.
Phormio was a naval officer by profession, and he won by genius
combined with superior efficiency in the personnel under his command.
In his courage, resourcefulness, in the spirit he inspired, and
the high pitch of skill he developed among his officers and men,
he is an ideal type for every later age. Little is known of his
life and character beyond the story of these two exploits, but
they are sufficient to give him the name of the first great admiral
of history.

His exploits illustrate, too, at the very outset of naval history,
the vital truth that the man counts more than the machine. In these
later days, when the tendency is to measure naval power merely by
counting dreadnoughts, and to settle all hypothetical combats by
the proportion of strength at a given point on the game board, it
is well to remember that the most overwhelming victories have been
won by the skill and audacity of a great leader, which overcame
odds that would be reckoned by the experts as insuperable.

The Peloponnesian war dragged on with varying fortunes for ten
years. The Athenians were regularly successful on the sea and
unsuccessful on land. They seem to have laid an unwise dependence
on their navy for a state situated on the mainland with land
communications open to the enemy. They attempted to make an island
of their state by withdrawing into the city of Athens the entire
population of Attica, leaving open to the invader the rest of the
province. The repeated ravaging of Attica by Peloponne