ive
to an enemy force less than half his own.
At any rate there was no lack of decision on the part of Phormio.
He advanced rapidly in line ahead formation, closed in near the
enemy's prows as if he intended to strike at any moment and circled
round the line. The Corinthian triremes, having no headway and
manned by inexperienced rowers, began crowding back on one another
as they tried to keep in position for the expected attack. Then the
same early morning wind that had embarrassed the Persian ships at
Salamis sprang up and added to the confusion of fouling ships and
clashing oar blades. Choosing his opening, Phormio flew the signal
for attack and rammed one of the flagships of the Corinthian fleet.
The Athenians fell upon their enemy and almost at the first blow
routed the entire Corinthian force. In addition to those triremes
that were sunk outright, twelve remained as prizes with their full
complement of crews, and the rest scattered in flight. Phormio
returned in triumph to Naupaktis with the loss of scarcely a man.
So humiliating a defeat had to be avenged, and Sparta organized
a new expedition. This time a fleet of 77 triremes was collected.
Meanwhile Phormio had sent to Athens the news of his victory together
with an urgent plea for reenforcements. Unfortunately the great
Pericles was dying and the government had fallen into weak and
unscrupulous hands. Consequently while 20 triremes were ordered to
the support of Phormio, political intrigue succeeded in diverting
this squadron to carry out a futile expedition to Crete, and Phormio
was left to contest the control of the gulf against a fleet of 77
with nothing more than his original twenty.
It is interesting to observe what strategy Phormio adopted in this
difficult situation. In the campaign of Salamis, Themistocles chose
the narrow waters of the strait as the safest position for a fleet
outnumbered by the enemy, because of the protection offered to the
flanks by the opposite shores. But Phormio, commanding a fleet about
one-fourth that of his adversary, chose the open sea. Apparently
his decision was based on the fact that the superiority of the
Athenian ship lay in its greater speed and skill in maneuvering.
Unable to cope with his adversary in full force, he might by his
superior mobility beat him in detail. Accordingly, he boldly took
the open sea.
For about a week the two fleets lay within sight of each other,
with Phormio trying to draw his enemy
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