ble to my great friend the Admiral and
myself.

"Either Babtie must order up the ships when and where he wants them, or
Porter must order the wounded down when he is ready for them. This is
my considered opinion."[24]

Have also sent an earnest message to K.--just the old, old story--saying
that what I want _first_ is drafts, and only _second_ fresh divisions.
My old Chief has been his kind self again:--so very considerate has he
been in his recent messages that I feel it almost brutal to press him or
to seem to wish to take advantage of his goodness. But we are dealing
with lives of men and I _must_ try and make myself clear:--

"I am anxious with regard to the question of reinforcements for units.
During the period 28th to 30th June, the Brigades of the XXIXth and
Lowland Divisions dropped in strengths approximately as follows:--86th
from 71 officers, 2,807 others to 36 and 1,994; 87th from 65 and 2,724
to 48 and 2,075; 88th from 63 and 2,139 to 46 and 1,765; 156th from 102
and 2,839 to 30 and 1,399. All Officers who have arrived from England to
date are included in the above figures. Maxwell has agreed to let me
have 80 young Officers from Egypt. Of the other ranks I have no
appreciable reinforcements to put in. This is the situation after an
operation carried out by the XXIXth and two brigades of LIInd Divisions,
which was not only successful but even more successful than we
anticipated; wherein the initial losses on 28th June were comparatively
small, namely 2,000, but as the result of numerous counter-attacks day
and night, have since swelled to some 3,500.

"The drafts promised in your No. 5793, A.G.2a, would, provided there
were no more casualties, bring the units of the XXIXth Division to
approximately 75 per cent. of establishment, but would leave none
available as further reinforcements.

"In view of the operations on a larger scale, with increased forces, I
feel I should draw your attention to the risk introduced by the theatre
of operations being so far from England. I have no reserves in base
depots now, while the operations we are engaged in are such that heavy
casualties are to be expected. The want of drafts ready on the spot to
fill up units which have suffered heavily might prevent me pressing to
full advantage as the result of a local success. At a critical moment I
might find myself compelled to suspend operations until the arrival of
drafts from England. This might involve a month and in the m