Toulon Harbour._ Embarked at
Marseilles last night at 6 p.m. and slept on board. Owing to some
mistake no oil fuel had been taken aboard so we have had to come round
here this morning to get it. Have just breakfasted with the Captain,
Cameron by name, and have let the Staff go ashore to see the town. We do
not sail till 2 p.m.: after special trains and everything a clean
chuck-away of 20 hours.

I left off in the S. of S.'s room at the War Office. After the bursting
of the aeroplane bomb K. did most of the talking. I find it hard to
remember all he said: here are the outstanding points:--

(1) We soldiers are to understand we are string Number 2. The sailors
are sure they can force the Dardanelles on their own and the whole
enterprise has been framed on that basis: we are to lie low and to bear
in mind the Cabinet does not want to hear anything of the Army till it
sails through the Straits. But if the Admiral fails, then we will have
to go in.

(2) If the Army has to be used, whether on the Bosphorus or at the
Dardanelles, I am to bear in mind his order that no serious operation is
to take place until the whole of my force is complete; ready;
concentrated and on the spot. No piecemeal attack is to be made.

(3) If we do start fighting, once we _have_ started we are to burn our
boats. Once landed the Government are resolved to see the enterprise
through.

(4) Asia is out of bounds. K. laid special stress on this. Our sea
command and the restricted area of Gallipoli would enable us to
undertake a landing on the Peninsula with clearly limited liabilities.
Once we began marching about continents, situations calling for heavy
reinforcements would probably be created. Although I, Hamilton, seemed
ready to run risks in the defence of London, he, K., was not, and as he
had already explained, big demands would make his position difficult
with France; difficult everywhere; and might end by putting him (K.) in
the cart. Besika Bay and Alexandretta were, therefore, taboo--not to be
touched! Even after we force the Narrows no troops are to be landed
along the Asian coastline. Nor are we to garrison any part of the
Gallipoli Peninsula excepting only the Bulair Lines which had best be
permanently held, K. thinks, by the Naval Division.

When we get into the Marmora I shall be faced by a series of big
problems. What would I do? From what quarter could I attack
Constantinople? How would I hold it when I had taken it? K. asked me