occur.

"But I would repeat; no action should be taken unless it has been
carefully thought out in all its possibilities and details and unless
there is a reasonable _probability_ of success.

"A. HUNTER-WESTON, M.G."

Paris's appreciation gives no very clear lead. "The enemy is of strength
unknown," he says, "but within striking distance there must be 250,000."
He also lays stress on the point that the enemy are expecting
us--"Surprise is now impossible--.... The difficulties are now increased
a hundredfold.... To land would be difficult enough if surprise was
possible but hazardous in the extreme under present conditions." He
discusses Gaba Tepe as a landing place; also Smyrna, and Bulair. On the
whole, he favours Sedd-el-Bahr as it "is the only place where transports
could come in close and where the actual landing may be unopposed. It is
open to question whether a landing could be effected elsewhere. With the
aid of the Fleet it may be possible to land near Cape Helles almost
unopposed and an advance of ten miles would enormously facilitate the
landing of the remainder South of Gaba Tepe."

The truth is, every one of these fellows agrees in his heart with old
Von der Goltz, the Berlin experts, and the Sultan of Egypt that the
landing is impossible. Well, we shall see, D.V., we shall see!! One
thing is certain: we must work up our preparations to the _n_th degree
of perfection: the impossible can only be overborne by the
unprecedented; i.e., by an original method or idea.

_10th April, 1915. S.S. "Arcadian." Lemnos._ Cast anchor at 7 a.m. After
breakfast went on board the _Queen Elizabeth_ where Braithwaite and I
worked for three hours with Admiral de Robeck, Admiral Wemyss and
Commodore Roger Keyes.

Last time the Admiral made the running; to-day it was my turn for I had
to unfold my scheme and go through it point by point with the sailors.
But first I felt it my duty to read out the appreciations of
Hunter-Weston, Birdwood and Paris. Then I gave them my own view that
history had never offered any nation so clean cut a chance of bringing
off an immeasurably big coup as she had done by putting our Fleet and
Army precisely where it was at present on the map of the war world. Half
that unique chance had already been muddled away by the lack of secrecy
and swiftness in our methods. With check mate within our grasp we had
given two moves to the enemy. Still, perhaps; n