gements. They did not,
therefore, call it a _perfecting_ of the security, but an _additional_
security, which it could not have been, if the first had been void; for
the Parliament could not bind itself more than the crown had bound
itself. And if all had made but _one_ security, neither of them could be
called _additional_ with propriety or common sense. But let us suppose
that they did apprehend there might have been something wanting in this
security without the sanction of Parliament. They were, however,
evidently mistaken; and this surplusage of theirs did not weaken the
validity of the single contract, upon the known principle of law, _Non
solent, quae abundant, vitiare scripturas_. For nothing is more evident
than that the crown was bound, and that no act can be made without the
royal assent. But the Constitution will warrant us in going a great deal
further, and in affirming, that a treaty executed by the crown, and
contradictory of no preceding law, is full as binding on the whole body
of the nation as if it had twenty times received the sanction of
Parliament; because the very same Constitution which has given to the
Houses of Parliament their definite authority has also left in the crown
the trust of making peace, as a consequence, and much the best
consequence, of the prerogative of making war. If the peace was ill
made, my Lord Galmoy, Coningsby, and Porter, who signed it, were
responsible; because they were subject to the community. But its own
contracts are not subject to it: it is subject to them; and the compact
of the king acting constitutionally was the compact of the nation.

Observe what monstrous consequences would result from a contrary
position. A foreign enemy has entered, or a strong domestic one has
arisen in the nation. In such events the circumstances may be, and often
have been, such that a Parliament cannot sit. This was precisely the
case in that rebellion in Ireland. It will be admitted also, that their
power may be so great as to make it very prudent to treat with them, in
order to save effusion of blood, perhaps to save the nation. Now could
such a treaty be at all made, if your enemies, or rebels, were fully
persuaded, that, in these times of confusion, there was no authority in
the state which could hold out to them an inviolable pledge for their
future security, but that there lurked in the Constitution a dormant,
but irresistible power, who would not think itself bound by the ordina