and others annex
the name MAN, and so be the nominal essence of the species so called:
yet nobody will say that complex idea is the real essence and source of
all those operations which are to be found in any individual of that
sort. The foundation of all those qualities which are the ingredients
of our complex idea, is something quite different: and had we such a
knowledge of that constitution of man; from which his faculties of
moving, sensation, and reasoning, and other powers flow, and on which
his so regular shape depends, as it is possible angels have, and it is
certain his Maker has, we should have a quite other idea of his essence
than what now is contained in our definition of that species, be it what
it will: and our idea of any individual man would be as far different
from what it is now, as is his who knows all the springs and wheels and
other contrivances within of the famous clock at Strasburg, from that
which a gazing countryman has of it, who barely sees the motion of the
hand, and hears the clock strike, and observes only some of the outward
appearances.

4. Nothing essential to Individuals.

That ESSENCE, in the ordinary use of the word, relates to sorts, and
that it is considered in particular beings no further than as they are
ranked into sorts, appears from hence: that, take but away the abstract
ideas by which we sort individuals, and rank them under common names,
and then the thought of anything essential to any of them instantly
vanishes: we have no notion of the one without the other, which plainly
shows their relation. It is necessary for me to be as I am; God and
nature has made me so: but there is nothing I have is essential to me.
An accident or disease may very much alter my colour or shape; a fever
or fall may take away my reason or memory, or both; and an apoplexy
leave neither sense, nor understanding, no, nor life. Other creatures of
my shape may be made with more and better, or fewer and worse faculties
than I have; and others may have reason and sense in a shape and body
very different from mine. None of these are essential to the one or the
other, or to any individual whatever, till the mind refers it to some
sort or species of things; and then presently, according to the abstract
idea of that sort, something is found essential. Let any one examine his
own thoughts, and he will find that as soon as he supposes or speaks
of essential, the consideration of some species, or the compl