re from an enemy whom you have gone out to attack, and whom you
have already placed at a disadvantage, before striking a blow, is weak
generalship indeed.
Hooker had arrived at Chancellorsville at noon Thursday. Lee was still
in Fredericksburg. The troops were able to march many miles farther
without undue taxing. They should have been pushed out that afternoon
to the open ground and to Banks's Ford. To fail in this, was the first
great error of the campaign. There had not been a moment's delay allowed
from the time the troops reached the river until they were massed
at Chancellorsville, and the proposed movement nearly completed. One
continued pressure, never let up, had constantly been exerted by the
headquarters of the army. The troops had been kept in constant movement
towards Banks's Ford. Hooker had all but reached his goal. Suddenly
occurred a useless, unexplained pause of twenty-four hours. And it
was during this unlucky gap of time that Lee occupied the ground which
Hooker's cavalry could have seized, and which should have been held at
all hazards.
Nor is this error excusable from ignorance of the terrain. For Hooker
had shown his knowledge of the importance of celerity; and his own
declared plan made Banks's Ford, still a half-dozen miles distant, his
one objective. In his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of
the War, he thus refers to his plan: "As soon as Couch's divisions and
Sykes's corps came up, I directed an advance for the purpose, in the
first instance, of driving the enemy away from Banks's Ford, which
was six miles down the river, in order that we might be in closer
communication with the left wing of the army." And if the troops had
needed repose, a few hours would have sufficed; and, the succeeding
night being clear moonlight, a forward movement was then entirely
feasible.
Dating from this delay of Thursday, every thing seemed to go wrong.
More curious still is Hooker's conduct on Friday, when his three columns
came into presence of the enemy. What every one would have expected
of Fighting Joe was, that at this supreme moment his energy would have
risen to its highest pitch. It was a slight task to hold the enemy for a
few hours. Before ordering the columns back, Hooker should have gone
in person to Sykes's front. Here he would have shortly ascertained that
Jackson was moving around his right. What easier than to leave a strong
enough force at the edge of the Wilderness, and to
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