g an attack from the enemy."
He also testifies, that, after the troops were ordered back to
Chancellorsville, they were for many hours massed there in considerable
confusion, until, after a deal of counter-marching, they were got into
place.
Pleasonton states that the retreat from open ground "produced among the
soldiers a feeling of uncertainty."
Hancock testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:
"I consider the mistake in the matter was in even stopping at
Chancellorsville.... I believe, if all... had pushed right down to
Banks's Ford, the whole movement would have been a perfect success. But
I have no doubt that we ought to have held our advance positions,
and still kept pushing on, and attempt to make a junction with Gen.
Sedgwick."
Gen. Warren, whose whole testimony and report are the clearest and most
useful of all the evidence obtainable from any single source, on this
campaign, suggested to Couch, who was supporting Sykes on Friday, when
the latter was attacked by Jackson, to delay carrying out Hooker's
orders to retire, while he (Warren) galloped back to headquarters to
explain the importance of holding the position, which was formidable and
had great tactical advantages. Hooker yielded; but, before Warren could
get back to the front, the previous orders had been obeyed, and
the position lost. He says: "I never should have stopped at
Chancellorsville. I should have advanced and fought the enemy, instead
of waiting for him to attack me. The character of the country was the
great reason for advancing."
And it is thought that every one engaged in this campaign with the Army
of the Potomac will remember the feeling of confusion and uncertainty
engendered by the withdrawal from Jackson's front on this unlucky day.
A council of general officers was held at Chancellorsville on Friday
evening, in which many were still strongly in favor of making the
advance again. Warren says: "I was in favor of advancing, and urged it
with more zeal than convincing argument." But Hooker held to his own
opinion. He could not appreciate the weakness of assuming the defensive
in the midst of the elan of a successful advance.
It is not difficult to state what Hooker should have done. He had a
definite plan, which was to uncover and use Banks's Ford. He should have
gone on in the execution of this plan until arrested by superior force,
or until something occurred to show that his plan was inexpedient. To
reti
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