move by his left
towards Banks's Ford, where he already had Meade's heavy column? This
would have kept his line of communication with United-States Ford
open, and, while uncovering Banks's Ford, would at the same time turn
Jackson's right. It is not as if such a movement carried him away from
his base, or uncovered his communications. It was the direct way to
preserve both.

But at this point Hooker faltered. Fighting Joe had reached the
culminating desire of his life. He had come face to face with his foe,
and had a hundred and twenty thousand eager and well-disciplined men
at his back. He had come to fight, and he--retreated without crossing
swords.

XI. THE POSITION AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.

The position at Chancellorsville was good for neither attack nor
defence. The ground was not open enough for artillery, except down
the few roads, and across an occasional clearing. Cavalry was useless.
Infantry could not advance steadily in line. The ground was such in
Hooker's front, that Lee could manoeuvre or mass his troops unseen by
him. Our own troops were so located, that to re-enforce any portion
of the line, which might be attacked, with sufficient speed, was
impossible.

Anderson (as has been stated) had been ordered by Lee to hold
Chancellorsville; but after examination of the ground, and consultation
with Mahone and Posey, he concluded to transcend his instructions, and
retired to the junction of Mine Road and the turnpike. He assumed that
the superiority of this latter ground would excuse his failure to hold
his position in the Wilderness.

Gen. Hancock says: "I consider that the position at Chancellorsville
was not a good one. It was a flat country, and had no local military
advantages."

And the testimony of all our general officers is strongly to the same
effect.

The position to which Hooker retired was the same which the troops,
wearied with their march of Thursday, had taken up without any
expectation of fighting a battle there. Hooker had desired to contract
his lines somewhat after Friday's check; but the feeling that farther
retreat would still more dishearten the men, already wondering at this
unexplained withdrawal, and the assurance of the generals on the right
that they could hold it against any force the enemy could bring against
their front, decided him in favor of leaving the line as it was, and of
strengthening it by breastworks and abattis.

Having established his troops in positio