work cut out for it. Even
to threaten Lee's communications would have seriously affected the
singleness of purpose he displayed in this campaign.
But the operations of Stoneman, as they had no effect whatever upon the
manoeuvres of either Lee or Hooker, may be treated of separately, as a
matter almost apart from the one under consideration.
And thus, in the failure of the cavalry raid, miscarried the first
effort of this ill-fated campaign.
It is not often that the danger of detaching the entire cavalry force
of an army, for service at a distance from its infantry corps, is
illustrated in so marked a manner as it was on this occasion. Hooker
left himself but a small brigade, of four regiments and a horse-battery,
to do the scouting for an army of over one hundred thousand men. Had he
retained a sufficient force to march with the main body, there would no
doubt have been at least a brigade of it, instead of a few scouts, sent
out to near Old Wilderness Tavern and along the Orange plank road to
the junction of the Brock road. Jackson's movements would then have been
fully known.
The bulk of the cavalry of an army should be with the infantry corps
when in the presence of the enemy. For cavalry are the antennae of an
army.
VII. THE FEINT BY THE LEFT WING.
Gen. Hooker's plan embraced, besides a cavalry raid to sever the enemy's
communications, a demonstration in force on the left to draw the enemy's
attention, and the throwing of the main body of his forces across the
river on the right.
As early as April 21, Doubleday of the First Corps had been sent down
the river to Port Conway with some thirty-five hundred men, to light
camp-fires, and make demonstrations with pontoons, after doing which
he returned to camp. On the 23d Col. Morrow, with the Twenty-fourth
Michigan, went down, and crossed the river to Port Royal in boats.
These demonstrations had been intended to co-operate with Stoneman's
raid, which at these dates should have been well on Lee's rear, and to
unsettle Lee's firm footing preparatory to the heavy blows Hooker was
preparing to deliver; but, as Stoneman was delayed, these movements
failed of much of their intended effect. Nevertheless, Jackson's corps
was drawn down to the vicinity, and remained there some days.
On Monday, April 27, Hooker issues his orders to the First, Third, and
Sixth Corps, to place themselves in position, ready to cross; the First
at Pollock's Mills Creek, and
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