auty of form, colour, sound, smell,
which are absolutely pure; and in general those which are unalloyed with
pain: (2) The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which
in themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of
forgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection,
of which we need take no account. At the same time, we admit that the
latter pleasures are the property of a very few. To these pure and
unmixed pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas all others belong to the
class of the infinite, and are liable to every species of excess. And
here several questions arise for consideration:--What is the meaning of
pure and impure, of moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question
by an illustration: Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or
quality of the white, and this is distinct from the quantity or amount
of white paint; a little pure white is fairer than a great deal which
is impure. But there is another question:--Pleasure is affirmed by
ingenious philosophers to be a generation; they say that there are
two natures--one self-existent, the other dependent; the one noble
and majestic, the other failing in both these qualities. 'I do not
understand.' There are lovers and there are loves. 'Yes, I know, but
what is the application?' The argument is in play, and desires to
intimate that there are relatives and there are absolutes, and that the
relative is for the sake of the absolute; and generation is for the
sake of essence. Under relatives I class all things done with a view to
generation; and essence is of the class of good. But if essence is
of the class of good, generation must be of some other class; and our
friends, who affirm that pleasure is a generation, would laugh at the
notion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion, that pleasure
is produced by generation, which is only the alternative of destruction.
Who would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure
thought? Here is one absurdity, and not the only one, to which the
friends of pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an absurdity in
affirming that good is of the soul only; or in declaring that the best
of men, if he be in pain, is bad?
And now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of
knowledge. Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge--the one
creative or productive, and the other educational and philosophical.
Of the creative arts, the
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