the argument that these actions regarded as a class will not
conduce to the happiness of mankind, though true enough, seems to have
less force than the feeling which is already implanted in the mind by
conscience and authority. To resolve this feeling into the greatest
happiness principle takes away from its sacred and authoritative
character. The martyr will not go to the stake in order that he may
promote the happiness of mankind, but for the sake of the truth:
neither will the soldier advance to the cannon's mouth merely because he
believes military discipline to be for the good of mankind. It is better
for him to know that he will be shot, that he will be disgraced, if he
runs away--he has no need to look beyond military honour, patriotism,
'England expects every man to do his duty.' These are stronger motives
than the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which is the thesis
of a philosopher, not the watchword of an army. For in human actions
men do not always require broad principles; duties often come home to
us more when they are limited and defined, and sanctioned by custom and
public opinion.

Lastly, if we turn to the history of ethics, we shall find that our
moral ideas have originated not in utility but in religion, in law, in
conceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many may be
inclined to think that this conclusively disproves the claim of utility
to be the basis of morals. But the utilitarian will fairly reply (see
above) that we must distinguish the origin of ethics from the principles
of them--the historical germ from the later growth of reflection. And he
may also truly add that for two thousand years and more, utility, if
not the originating, has been the great corrective principle in law, in
politics, in religion, leading men to ask how evil may be diminished
and good increased--by what course of policy the public interest may be
promoted, and to understand that God wills the happiness, not of some
of his creatures and in this world only, but of all of them and in every
stage of their existence.

'What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral
philosophy?' is analogous to the question asked in the Philebus, 'What
rank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?' Admitting the greatest
happiness principle to be true and valuable, and the necessary
foundation of that part of morals which relates to the consequences of
actions, we still have to consider whether thi