eration of Arnold and Cornwallis. The British troops which had
landed at Wilmington, were merely a small detachment sent from
Charleston to establish a military depot for the use of Cornwallis in
his southern campaign. They had taken possession of Wilmington without
opposition. Greene now changed his plans. He was aware of the
ill-provided state of the British army, from the voluntary destruction
of their wagons, tents and baggage. His plan now was to tempt the
enemy continually with the prospect of a battle, but continually to
elude one; to harass them by a long pursuit, draw them higher into the
country, and gain time for the division advancing under Huger to join
him. It was the Fabian policy that he had learnt under Washington, of
whom he prided himself on being a disciple.

As the subsiding of the Catawba would enable Cornwallis to cross,
Greene ordered Morgan to move off silently with his division on the
evening of the 31st, and to press his march all night, so as to gain a
good start in advance, while he (Greene) would remain to bring on the
militia, who were employed to check the enemy. These militia,
assembled from the neighboring counties, did not exceed five hundred.
Two hundred of them were distributed at different fords: the remaining
three hundred, forming a corps of mounted riflemen under General
Davidson, were to watch the movements of the enemy, and attack him
wherever he should make his main attempt to cross. When the enemy
should have actually crossed, the different bodies of militia were to
make the best of their way to a rendezvous, sixteen miles distant, on
the road to Salisbury. While these dispositions were being made by the
American commander, Cornwallis was preparing to cross the river. The
night of the 31st was chosen for the attempt. To divert the attention
of the Americans, he detached Colonels Webster and Tarleton with a
part of the army to a public ford called Beattie's ford, where he
supposed Davidson to be stationed. There they were to make a feint of
forcing a passage. The main attempt, however, was to be made six miles
lower down, where little, if any, opposition was anticipated.

Cornwallis set out with the main body of his army at one o'clock in
the morning. The night was dark and rainy. It was near daybreak by the
time the head of the column reached the ford. To their surprise, they
beheld numerous camp fires on the opposite bank. Word was hastily
carried to Cornwallis that the for