rnt
that Morgan had crossed the main stream. Now he felt the loss he had
sustained in the late defeat of Tarleton, of a great part of his light
troops. In this crippled condition, he determined to relieve his army
of everything that could impede rapid movement in his future
operations. Two days, therefore, were spent by him at Ramsour's Mills,
in destroying all such baggage and stores as could possibly be spared.

General Greene was gladdened by a letter from Morgan, written shortly
after his defeat of Tarleton, and transmitted the news to Washington
with his own generous comments. He had recently received intelligence
of the landing of troops at Wilmington, from a British squadron,
supposed to be a force under Arnold, destined to push up Cape Fear
River, and co-operate with Cornwallis; he had to prepare, therefore,
not only to succor Morgan, but to prevent this co-operation. He
accordingly detached General Stevens with his Virginia militia (whose
term of service was nearly expired) to take charge of Morgan's
prisoners, and conduct them to Charlottesville in Virginia. At the
same time he wrote to the governors of North Carolina and Virginia for
all the aid they could furnish; to Steuben to hasten forward his
recruits, and to Shelby, Campbell and others to take arms once more
and rival their achievements at King's Mountain.

This done, he left General Huger in command of the division on the
Pedee, with orders to hasten on by forced marches to Salisbury, to
join the other division; in the meantime he set off on horseback for
Morgan's camp, attended merely by a guide, an aide-de-camp, and a
sergeant's guard of dragoons. His object was to aid Morgan in
assembling militia and checking the enemy until the junction of his
forces could be effected. It was a hard ride of upwards of a hundred
miles through a rough country. On the last day of January he reached
Morgan's camp at Sherrard's ford on the east side of the Catawba. The
British army lay on the opposite side of the river, but a few miles
distant from it, and appeared to be making preparations to force a
passage across, as it was subsiding, and would soon be fordable.
Greene supposed Cornwallis had in view a junction with Arnold at Cape
Fear; he wrote, therefore, to General Huger to hurry on, so that with
their united forces they could give his lordship a defeat before he
could effect the junction.

More correct information relieved him from the apprehension of a
co-op