d upon the balance,
and, consequently, that it is a physical energy, capable of affecting
the material world just as any other physical energy does.

PART II

Theories

It may be contended, however, that in thus postulating the human will as
a physical energy I have not taken into account the alternative
explanation of the facts which might be adopted or assumed. This theory
contends that it is not the will itself which causes the movement we
observe, but the cerebral activity which corresponds to it, and is its
physiological counterpart. It has frequently been pointed out before
(_cf._ Ribot, _The Diseases of the Will_, pp. 5, 6), that when we will
to move our arm, e.g., it may not be the will at all, _per se_, which
affects the movement, but the brain-state or neural activity which
accompanies the act of will. In other words, mind or will never affects
matter (as we feel it does), but it is always one portion of the body
which affects another portion--the will or state of consciousness being
merely coincidental with this observed action.

This has been one of the classical objections to the doctrine of
inter-actionism; and it must not be thought that I have failed to take
into account this alternate theory. But opposed to this view of the case
we have the facts--(1) that the state of consciousness, and not the
brain-state, is surely here the important factor; and (2) that, even
were the supposition true, this nervous action or influence must cease
at the periphery of the body; for, were this not the case, we should
already have exceeded the limits of the orthodox physiological theory,
which contends that one portion _of the body_ affects another portion
(only), and does not contend or pretend that this action may extend
beyond the surface of the body; for, if it did so extend, we should have
a nervous current without nerves--an appalling fact, and one totally
opposed to accepted physiological teaching!

In order for nervous energy or life force to exist independent of the
body (upon the functionings of which it supposedly depends), it would be
necessary for us to reconstruct the mechanistic interpretation of life,
since it would show that life is not dependent upon the body for its
existence, but might exist independently of it, which is the very point
in dispute. It cannot logically be contended, therefore, that the
energy which we here see in operation lies in the nerves or in the
brain-centres, but rather t