e of inter-actionism; and
at the same time virtually proves that theory correct--thus solving this
problem once and for all!

It may be pointed out, _en passant_, that philosophers and
metaphysicians have really attacked this problem from the wrong
standpoint--in their arguments concerning the relations of mind and
brain--for this is a question which might have been (and in my opinion
should have been) determined not by argument, but by _fact_. Instead of
arguing, _a priori_, as to the nature of the connection, the problem
might have been solved in the same way that all other problems are
solved, viz., by an appeal to evidence and fact. The fundamental point
made by practically all philosophers, in discussing this question, is
that brain-states and conscious states are always found together, and
that consciousness can never exist in the absence of brain. In other
words, mind cannot exist as an "independent variable" in the world; it
must always accompany a human brain.

I pass over, without comment, the fact that, according to the doctrines
of idealistic monism and psycho-physical parallelism, this independence
is virtually allowed, by the very nature of the doctrine; and shall
point out merely that, if consciousness could be proved to exist
independent of brain functioning, philosophic theories would have to be
remodelled to conform to the evidence; the _a priori_ problem could be
settled at once by an appeal to actual fact. And again this separate
existence of consciousness seems to be established by the facts of
"psychical research," which apparently show that mind can exist apart
from brain structure. This important fact once established, it would at
once alter the whole case and render inter-actionism not only a
"respectable" theory, but a proved fact.

So much for the importance of this doctrine (that the will is a physical
energy) from the point of view of philosophy, and as applied to the
question of the inter-relation of brain and mind. Now let us see if it
cannot be applied in another direction.

The present interpretation of the character and nature of the will, and
its inclusion as a physical energy, has a distinctly important bearing
upon one of the most bitterly disputed points in the whole history of
philosophy, viz., the question of the _Freedom of the Will_.

As is well known, there are two opposing views upon this subject--held
by opposite schools--the theory of Determinism, on the one hand, and o