power to
displace them. It would be a violation of the plain meaning of this
enactment to place Mr. Stanton upon the same footing as those heads of
Departments who have been appointed by myself. As to him, this law gives
him no tenure of office. The members of my Cabinet who have been
appointed by me are by this act entitled to hold for one month after the
term of my office shall cease; but Mr. Stanton could not, against the
wishes of my successor, hold a moment thereafter. If he were permitted
by that successor to hold for the first two weeks, would that successor
have no power to remove him? But the power of my successor over him
could be no greater than my own. If my successor would have the power to
remove Mr. Stanton after permitting him to remain a period of two weeks,
because he was not appointed by him, but by his predecessor, I, who have
tolerated Mr. Stanton for more than two years, certainly have the same
right to remove him, and upon the same ground, namely, that he was not
appointed by me, but by my predecessor.

Under this construction of the tenure-of-office act, I have never
doubted my power to remove Mr. Stanton.

Whether the act were constitutional or not, it was always my opinion
that it did not secure him from removal. I was, however, aware that
there were doubts as to the construction of the law, and from the first
I deemed it desirable that at the earliest possible moment those doubts
should be settled and the true construction of the act fixed by decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States. My order of suspension in
August last was intended to place the case in such a position as would
make a resort to a judicial decision both necessary and proper. My
understanding and wishes, however, under that order of suspension were
frustrated, and the late order for Mr. Stanton's removal was a further
step toward the accomplishment of that purpose.

I repeat that my own convictions as to the true construction of the law
and as to its constitutionality were well settled and were sustained
by every member of my Cabinet, including Mr. Stanton himself. Upon the
question of constitutionality, each one in turn deliberately advised me
that the tenure-of-office act was unconstitutional. Upon the question
whether, as to those members who were appointed by my predecessor,
that act took from me the power to remove them, one of those members
emphatically stated in the presence of the others sitting in Cabinet