ongress, extending through the eight years of his Administration. In
his message of 1829 he said:

To the people belongs the right of electing their Chief Magistrate; it
was never designed that their choice should in any case be defeated,
either by the intervention of electoral colleges or by the agency
confided, under certain contingencies, to the House of Representatives.

He then proceeded to state the objections to an election of President
by the House of Representatives, the most important of which was that
the choice of a clear majority of the people might be easily defeated.
He then closed the argument with the following communication:

I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the Constitution as
may remove all intermediate agency in the election of the President and
Vice-President. The mode may be so regulated as to preserve to each
State its present relative weight in the election, and a failure in the
first attempt may be provided for by confining the second to a choice
between the two highest candidates. In connection with such an amendment
it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to
a single term of either four or six years. If, however, it should not be
adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying
for office the Representatives in Congress on whom such an election may
have devolved would not be proper.

Although this recommendation was repeated with undiminished
earnestness in several of his succeeding messages, yet the proposed
amendment was never adopted and submitted to the people by Congress. The
danger of a defeat of the people's choice in an election by the House of
Representatives remains unprovided for in the Constitution, and would
be greatly increased if the House of Representatives should assume the
power arbitrarily to reject the votes of a State which might not be
cast in conformity with the wishes of the majority in that body.

But if President Jackson failed to secure the amendment to the
Constitution which he urged so persistently, his arguments contributed
largely to the formation of party organizations, which have effectually
avoided the contingency of an election by the House of Representatives.
These organizations, first by a resort to the caucus system of
nominating candidates, and afterwards to State and national conventions,
have been successful in so limiting the number of candidates