new duties, but as a civil
officer of the State only takes the same oath which he had already taken
as a military officer of the United States. He is, at last, a military
officer performing civil duties, and the authority under which he acts
is Federal authority only; and the inevitable result is that the Federal
Government, by the agency of its own sworn officers, in effect assumes
the civil government of the State.

A singular contradiction is apparent here. Congress declares these local
State governments to be illegal governments, and then provides that
these illegal governments shall be carried on by Federal officers, who
are to perform the very duties imposed on its own officers by this
illegal State authority. It certainly would be a novel spectacle if
Congress should attempt to carry on a _legal_ State government by the
agency of its own officers. It is yet more strange that Congress
attempts to sustain and carry on an _illegal_ State government by the
same Federal agency.

In this connection I must call attention to the tenth and eleventh
sections of the bill, which provide that none of the officers or
appointees of these military commanders "shall be bound in his action by
any opinion of any civil officer of the United States," and that all the
provisions of the act "shall be construed liberally, to the end that all
the intents thereof may be fully and perfectly carried out."

It seems Congress supposed that this bill might require construction,
and they fix, therefore, the rule to be applied. But where is the
construction to come from? Certainly no one can be more in want of
instruction than a soldier or an officer of the Army detailed for a
civil service, perhaps the most important in a State, with the duties of
which he is altogether unfamiliar. This bill says he shall not be bound
in his action by the opinion of any civil officer of the United States.
The duties of the office are altogether civil, but when he asks for an
opinion he can only ask the opinion of another military officer, who,
perhaps, understands as little of his duties as he does himself; and as
to his "action," he is answerable to the military authority, and to the
military authority alone. Strictly, no opinion of any civil officer
other than a judge has a binding force.

But these military appointees would not be bound even by a judicial
opinion. They might very well say, even when their action is in conflict
with the Supreme Court of