e Constitution may even come to be considered meritorious. If the
officer be accused of dishonesty, how shall it be made out? Will it be
inferred from acts unconnected with public duty, from private history,
or from general reputation, or must the President await the commission
of an actual misdemeanor in office? Shall he in the meantime risk the
character and interest of the nation in the hands of men to whom he
can not give his confidence? Must he forbear his complaint until the
mischief is done and can not be prevented? If his zeal in the public
service should impel him to anticipate the overt act, must he move at
the peril of being tried himself for the offense of slandering his
subordinate? In the present circumstances of the country someone must be
held responsible for official delinquency of every kind. It is extremely
difficult to say where that responsibility should be thrown if it be
not left where it has been placed by the Constitution. But all just men
will admit that the President ought to be entirely relieved from such
responsibility if he can not meet it by reason of restrictions placed
by law upon his action.

The unrestricted power of removal from office is a very great one to be
trusted even to a magistrate chosen by the general suffrage of the whole
people and accountable directly to them for his acts. It is undoubtedly
liable to abuse, and at some periods of our history perhaps has been
abused. If it be thought desirable and constitutional that it should be
so limited as to make the President merely a common informer against
other public agents, he should at least be permitted to act in that
capacity before some open tribunal, independent of party politics, ready
to investigate the merits of every case, furnished with the means of
taking evidence, and bound to decide according to established rules.
This would guarantee the safety of the accuser when he acts in good
faith, and at the same time secure the rights of the other party. I
speak, of course, with all proper respect for the present Senate, but it
does not seem to me that any legislative body can be so constituted as
to insure its fitness for these functions.

It is not the theory of this Government that public offices are the
property of those who hold them. They are given merely as a trust for
the public benefit, sometimes for a fixed period, sometimes during good
behavior, but generally they are liable to be terminated at the pleasure
of th