nts be true, then the abolition of
slavery by these illegal governments binds no one, for Congress now
denies to these States the power to abolish slavery by denying to them
the power to elect a legal State legislature, or to frame a constitution
for any purpose, even for such a purpose as the abolition of slavery.

As to the other constitutional amendment, having reference to suffrage,
it happens that these States have not accepted it. The consequence is
that it has never been proclaimed or understood, even by Congress, to be
a part of the Constitution of the United States. The Senate of the
United States has repeatedly given its sanction to the appointment of
judges, district attorneys, and marshals for every one of these States;
yet, if they are not legal States, not one of these judges is authorized
to hold a court. So, too, both Houses of Congress have passed
appropriation bills to pay all these judges, attorneys, and officers of
the United States for exercising their functions in these States. Again,
in the machinery of the internal-revenue laws all these States are
districted, not as "Territories," but as "States."

So much for continuous legislative recognition. The instances cited,
however, fall far short of all that might be enumerated. Executive
recognition, as is well known, has been frequent and unwavering. The
same maybe said as to judicial recognition through the Supreme Court of
the United States. That august tribunal, from first to last, in the
administration of its duties _in banc_ and upon the circuit, has never
failed to recognize these ten communities as legal States of the Union.
The cases depending in that court upon appeal and writ of error from
these States when the rebellion began have not been dismissed upon any
idea of the cessation of jurisdiction. They were carefully continued
from term to term until the rebellion was entirely subdued and peace
reestablished, and then they were called for argument and consideration
as if no insurrection had intervened. New cases, occurring since the
rebellion, have come from these States before that court by writ of
error and appeal, and even by original suit, where only "a State" can
bring such a suit. These cases are entertained by that tribunal in the
exercise of its acknowledged jurisdiction, which could not attach to
them if they had come from any political body other than a State of the
Union. Finally, in the allotment of their circuits made by the ju