at the pleasure of the head of the department, because he is
invested generally with the executive authority, and the participation
in that authority by the Senate was an exception to a general principle
and ought to be taken strictly. The President is the great responsible
officer for the faithful execution of the law, and the power of removal
was incidental to that duty, and might often be requisite to fulfill it.

Thus has the important question presented by this bill been settled, in
the language of the late Daniel Webster (who, while dissenting from it,
admitted that it was settled), by construction, settled by precedent,
settled by the practice of the Government, and settled by statute. The
events of the last war furnished a practical confirmation of the wisdom
of the Constitution as it has hitherto been maintained in many of its
parts, including that which is now the subject of consideration. When
the war broke out, rebel enemies, traitors, abettors, and sympathizers
were found in every Department of the Government, as well in the civil
service as in the land and naval military service. They were found in
Congress and among the keepers of the Capitol; in foreign missions; in
each and all the Executive Departments; in the judicial service; in the
post-office, and among the agents for conducting Indian affairs. Upon
probable suspicion they were promptly displaced by my predecessor, so
far as they held their offices under executive authority, and their
duties were confided to new and loyal successors. No complaints against
that power or doubts of its wisdom were entertained in any quarter. I
sincerely trust and believe that no such civil war is likely to occur
again. I can not doubt, however, that in whatever form and on whatever
occasion sedition can raise an effort to hinder or embarrass or defeat
the legitimate action of this Government, whether by preventing the
collection of revenue, or disturbing the public peace, or separating the
States, or betraying the country to a foreign enemy, the power of
removal from office by the Executive, as it has heretofore existed and
been practiced, will be found indispensable.

Under these circumstances, as a depositary of the executive authority of
the nation, I do not feel at liberty to unite with Congress in reversing
it by giving my approval to the bill. At the early day when this
question was settled, and, indeed, at the several periods when it has
subsequent