ate to the affairs of the community and which if not well conducted
occasion seditions and commotions in the state. Now, of necessity,
either all persons must have a right to judge of all these different
causes, appointed for that purpose, either by vote or lot, or all of
all, some of them by vote, and others by lot, or in some causes by vote,
in others by lot. Thus there will be four sorts of judges. There [1301a]
will be just the same number also if they are chosen out of part of the
people only; for either all the judges must be chosen out of that part
either by vote or lot, or some by lot and some by vote, or the judges in
particular causes must be chosen some by vote, others by lot; by which
means there will be the same number of them also as was mentioned.
Besides, different judges may be joined together; I mean those who are
chosen out of the whole people or part of them or both; so that all
three may sit together in the same court, and this either by vote,
lot, or both. And thus much for the different sorts of judges. Of these
appointments that which admits all the community to be judges in all
causes is most suitable to a democracy; the second, which appoints that
certain persons shall judge all causes, to an oligarchy; the third,
which appoints the whole community to be judges in some causes, but
particular persons in others, to an aristocracy or free state.

BOOK V

CHAPTER I

We have now gone through those particulars we proposed to speak of; it
remains that we next consider from what causes and how alterations
in government arise, and of what nature they are, and to what the
destruction of each state is owing; and also to what form any form of
polity is most likely to shift into, and what are the means to be
used for the general preservation of governments, as well as what are
applicable to any particular state; and also of the remedies which
are to be applied either to all in general, or to any one considered
separately, when they are in a state of corruption: and here we ought
first to lay down this principle, that there are many governments, all
of which approve of what is just and what is analogically equal; and yet
have failed from attaining thereunto, as we have already mentioned; thus
democracies have arisen from supposing that those who are equal in one
thing are so in every other circumstance; as, because they are equal
in liberty, they are equal in everything else; and oligarchies,