yrannies; and
indeed most of the ancient tyrannies arose from those states: a reason
for which then subsisted, but not now; for at that time the demagogues
were of the soldiery; for they were not then powerful by their
eloquence; but, now the art of oratory is cultivated, the able speakers
are at present the demagogues; but, as they are unqualified to act in
a military capacity, they cannot impose themselves on the people as
tyrants, if we except in one or two trifling instances. Formerly, too,
tyrannies were more common than now, on account of the very extensive
powers with which some magistrates were entrusted: as the prytanes at
Miletus; for they were supreme in many things of the last consequence;
and also because at that time the cities were not of that very great
extent, the people in general living in the country, and being employed
in husbandry, which gave them, who took the lead in public affairs, an
opportunity, if they had a turn for war, to make themselves tyrants;
which they all did when they had gained the confidence of the people;
and this confidence was their hatred to the rich. This was the case of
Pisistratus at Athens, when he opposed the Pediaci: and of Theagenes in
Megara, who slaughtered the cattle belonging to the rich, after he
had seized those who kept them by the riverside. Dionysius also, for
accusing Daphnseus and the rich, was thought worthy of being raised to a
tyranny, from the confidence which the people had of his being a popular
man in consequence of these enmities. A government shall also alter from
its ancient and approved democratic form into one entirely new, if
there is no census to regulate the election of magistrates; for, as the
election is with the people, the demagogues who are desirous of being in
office, to flatter them, will endeavour with all their power to make the
people superior even to the laws. To prevent this entirely, or at least
in a great measure, the magistrates should be elected by the tribes, and
not by the people at large. These are nearly the revolutions to which
democracies are liable, and also the causes from whence they arise.

CHAPTER VI

There are two things which of all others most evidently occasion a
revolution in an oligarchy; one is, when the people are ill used, for
then every individual is ripe for [1305b] sedition; more particularly if
one of the oligarchy should happen to be their leader; as Lygdamis, at
Naxus, who was afterwards tyrant