aged at Carthage, and preserved the
affections of the people; for by continually sending some of their
community into colonies they procured plenty. It is also worthy of a
sensible and generous nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and
supplying them with what is necessary, induce them to work; or to
imitate the conduct of the people at Tarentum: for they, permitting the
poor to partake in common of everything which is needful for them, gain
the affections of the commonalty. They have also two different ways of
electing their magistrates; for some are chosen by vote, others by
lot; by the last, that the people at large may have some share in the
administration; by the former, that the state may be well governed: the
same may be accomplished if of the same magistrates you choose some by
vote, others by lot. And thus much for the manner in which democracies
ought to be established.

CHAPTER VI

What has been already said will almost of itself sufficiently show how
an oligarchy ought to be founded; for he who would frame such a state
should have in his view a democracy to oppose it; for every species of
oligarchy should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to some
species of democracy.

The first and best-framed oligarchy is that which approaches near to
what we call a free state; in which there ought to be two different
census, the one high, the other low: from those who are within the
latter the ordinary officers of the state ought to be chosen; from the
former the supreme magistrates: nor should any one be excluded from a
part of the administration who was within the census; which should be
so regulated that the commonalty who are included in it should by means
thereof be superior to those who have no share in the government; for
those who are to have the management of public affairs ought always to
be chosen out of the better sort of the people. Much in the same manner
ought that oligarchy to be established which is next in order: but as to
that which is most opposite to a pure democracy, and approaches nearest
to a dynasty and a tyranny, as it is of all others the worst, so it
requires the greatest care and caution to preserve it: for as bodies of
sound and healthy constitutions and ships which are well manned and
well found for sailing can bear many injuries without perishing, while
a diseased body or a leaky ship with an indifferent crew cannot support
the [1321a] least shock; so the worst-