they lose their brightness: the fault of
which lies in the legislator, who never taught them how to be at rest.
CHAPTER XV
As there is one end common to a man both as an individual and a citizen,
it is evident that a good man and a good citizen must have the same
object in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead to rest
are necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is peace, of
labour, rest; but those virtues whose object is rest, and those also
whose object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life and rest; for
we want a supply of many necessary things that we may be at rest. A city
therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient; for, according to
the proverb, "Rest is not for slaves;" but those who cannot bravely face
danger are the slaves of those who attack them. Bravery, therefore, and
patience are necessary for labour, philosophy for rest, and temperance
and justice in both; but these chiefly in time of peace and rest; for
war obliges men to be just and temperate; but the enjoyment of pleasure,
with the rest of peace, is more apt to produce insolence; those indeed
who are easy in their circumstances, and enjoy everything that can
make them happy, have great occasion for the virtues of temperance and
justice. Thus if there are, as the poets tell us, any inhabitants in
the happy isles, to these a higher degree of philosophy, temperance, and
justice will be necessary, as they live at their ease in the full plenty
of every sensual pleasure. It is evident, therefore, that these virtues
are necessary in every state that would be happy or worthy; for he who
is worthless can never enjoy real good, much less is he qualified to
be at rest; but can appear good only by labour and being at war, but
in peace and at rest the meanest of creatures. For which reason virtue
should not be cultivated as the Lacedaemonians did; for they did not
differ from others in their opinion concerning the supreme good, but in
[1334b] imagining this good was to be procured by a particular virtue;
but since there are greater goods than those of war, it is evident
that the enjoyment of those which are valuable in themselves should be
desired, rather than those virtues which are useful in war; but how and
by what means this is to be acquired is now to be considered. We have
already assigned three causes on which it will depend; nature, custom,
and reason, arid shown what sort of men nature must produce for th
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