d also when
some desire to contract the power of the oligarchy into fewer hands; for
those who endeavour to support an equality are obliged to apply to the
people for assistance. An oligarchy is also subject to revolutions
when the nobility spend their fortunes by luxury; for such persons are
desirous of innovations, and either endeavour to be tyrants themselves
or to support others in being so, as [1306a] Hypparinus supported
Dionysius of Syracuse. And at Amphipolis one Cleotimus collected a
colony of Chal-cidians, and when they came set them to quarrel with
the rich: and at AEgina a certain person who brought an action against
Chares attempted on that account to alter the government. Sometimes they
will try to raise commotions, sometimes they will rob the public, and
then quarrel with each other, or else fight with those who endeavour
to detect them; which was the case at Apollonia in Pontus. But if the
members of an oligarchy agree among themselves the state is not very
easily destroyed without some external force. Pharsalus is a proof of
this, where, though the place is small, yet the citizens have great
power, from the prudent use they make of it. An oligarchy also will be
destroyed when they create another oligarchy under it; that is, when the
management of public affairs is in the hands of a few, and not equally,
but when all of them do not partake of the supreme power, as happened
once at Elis, where the supreme power in general was in the hands of a
very few out of whom a senate was chosen, consisting but of ninety' who
held their places for life; and their mode of election was calculated to
preserve the power amongst each other's families, like the senators at
Lacedaemon. An oligarchy is liable to a revolution both in time of
war and peace; in war, because through a distrust in the citizens the
government is obliged to employ mercenary troops, and he to whom they
give the command of the army will very often assume the tyranny, as
Timophanes did at Corinth; and if they appoint more than one general,
they will very probably establish a dynasty: and sometimes, through fear
of this, they are forced to let the people in general have some share in
the government, because they are obliged to employ them. In peace,
from their want of confidence in each other, they will entrust the
guardianship of the state to mercenaries and their general, who will
be an arbiter between them, and sometimes become master of both, which