been radically different. Evidently, however, he
committed a blunder which his countrymen in modern times have
conspicuously avoided; he drew the sword without having fully
investigated his adversary's resources.

"Just about the time when the van of the Japanese army was entering
Seoul, the Korean admiral, Yi Sun-sin, at the head of a fleet of
eighty vessels, attacked the Japanese squadron which lay at anchor
near the entrance to Fusan harbour, set twenty-six of the vessels on
fire, and dispersed the rest. Four other engagements ensued in rapid
succession. The last and most important took place shortly after the
Japanese troops had seized Pyong-yang. It resulted in the sinking of
over seventy Japanese vessels, transports and fighting ships
combined, which formed the main part of a flotilla carrying
reinforcements by sea to the van of the invading army. This despatch
of troops and supplies by water had been a leading feature of
Hideyoshi's plan of campaign, and the destruction of the flotilla to
which the duty was entrusted may be said to have sealed the fate of
the war by isolating the army in Korea from its home base.

"It is true that Konishi Yukinaga, who commanded the first division,
desired to continue his northward march from Pyong-yang without
delay. He argued that China was wholly unprepared, and that the best
hope of ultimate victory lay in not giving her time to collect her
forces. But the commander-in-chief, Ukita Hideiye, refused to endorse
this plan. He took the view that since the Korean provinces were
still offering desperate resistance, supplies could not be drawn from
them, neither could the troops engaged in subjugating them be freed
for service at the front. Therefore it was essential to await the
consummation of the second phase of Hideyoshi's plan, namely, the
despatch of re-enforcements and munitions by water to Pyong-yang. The
reader has seen how that second phase fared. The Japanese commander
at Pyong-yang never received any accession of strength. His force
suffered constant diminution from casualties, and the question of
commissariat became daily more difficult. . . . Japanese historians
themselves admit the fact that no wise effort was made to conciliate
the Korean people. They were treated so harshly that even the humble
peasant took up arms, and thus the peninsula, instead of serving as a
basis of supplies, had to be garrisoned perpetually by a strong
army."* Korean historians give long a