y_, i. ch. ii. _R.F._ p. 310 foll. See Appendix
D.

[104] This view was originally stated in Pauly-Wissowa,
_s.v._ "Argei." I endeavoured to confute it in the
_Classical Review_, 1902, p. 115 foll., and Wissowa
replied in _Gesammelte Abhandlungen_, p. 211 foll. Since
then my conviction has become stronger that this great
scholar is for once wrong. Ennius alluded to the Argei
as an institution of Numa, _i.e._ as primitive (frag.
121, Vahlen, from Festus p. 355, and Varro, _L.L._ vii.
44), yet Ennius was a youth at the very time when
Wissowa insists that the rite originated. Wissowa makes
no attempt to explain this. See below, p. 321 foll.

[105] _R.F._ p. 111 foll.

[106] _e.g._ the October horse, which also occurred on
the Ides; see _R.F._ p. 241 foll.; and the festival of
Anna Perenna, also on Ides (March 15), _R.F._ p. 50
foll. It is just possible that all the three festivals
were originally in the old calendar, and dropped out
because the mark of the Ides had to be affixed to the
day in the first place. See Wissowa, _Gesammelte
Abhandlungen_, p. 164 foll.; _R.F._ p. 241.

[107] Thus Messrs. Hubert et Mauss (_Melanges d'histoire
des religions_, Preface, p. xxiv.) maintain that there
is no real antinomy between "les faits du systeme
magique et les faits du systeme religieux." There is in
every rite, they insist, a magical as well as a
religious element. Yet on the same page we find that
they exclude magic from all organised cult, because it
is not obligatory, and cannot (if I understand them
rightly) be laid down in a code, like religious
practice. I think it would have been simpler to consider
the magical element in religious rites as surviving,
with its original meaning lost, from an earlier stage of
thought. M. van Gennep, in his interesting work _Les
Rites de passage_, p. 17, goes so far as to call all
religious _ceremonies_ magical, as distinguished from
the _theories_ (_e.g._ animism) which constitute
religion. This seems to me apt to bring confusion into
the discussion; for all rites are the outward expression
of thought, and it is by the thought (or, as he calls
it, theories) that we must trace the sociological
development of mankind, the rites being used as indexes
only. I cannot but think that (as indeed in these days
is quit