or our troops it was a
total defeat. They had been forced to abandon the outer line of
defence--the very line Washington wished should be held "at all
hazards"--and had been driven into the fortified camp on the Brooklyn
peninsula. This result would have inevitably come, sooner or later,
but no one could have entertained the possibility of its coming in
this sudden and disastrous shape.
* * * * *
Looking back over the day's work, the cause of the defeat is apparent
at once: _We had been completely outflanked and surprised on the
Jamaica Road._ Where the responsibility for the surprise should rest
is another question. Evidently, if that patrol of officers had not
been captured, but, upon discovering the approach of the enemy, had
carried the word directly to Miles' camp and to headquarters, the
enemy would not have gained the rear of our outposts without warning.
Miles and Wyllys could have interposed themselves across their path,
and held the ground long enough at least to put our troops at the
other points on their guard. The surprise of this patrol, therefore,
can alone explain the defeat. But as the officers appear to have been
sent out as an additional precaution, the responsibility must be
shared by Miles and his regiment, who were the permanent guard on the
left. Brodhead, who wrote eight days after the event, distinctly
asserts that there were no troops beyond them, and that, for want of
videttes, that flank was left for them to watch. Parsons, as officer
of the day, reports that Miles was expected to patrol across the
Jamaica Road. But to charge the colonel personally with a fatal
mistake or neglect is not warranted by the facts. His own patrols and
pickets may have failed him. The simple fact appears that this
regiment was put upon our left, that our left was turned, and the
battle lost in consequence. As to the generalship of the day, if the
responsibility falls on any one, it falls first on Sullivan, who sent
out the mounted patrol in the first instance, and to whom it belonged
to follow up the precautions in that direction. Putnam was in chief
command, but nothing can be inferred from contemporary records to
fasten neglect or blunder upon him any more than upon Washington, who,
when he left the Brooklyn lines on the evening of the 26th, must have
known precisely what disposition had been made for the night at the
hills and passes. And upon Washington certainly the responsib
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