the road for demotion of incompetence should likewise be open.
These conditions are probably favored more by a democracy than by any
other form of government, and to that extent democracy is distinctly
advantageous to eugenics.

Yet this eugenic effect is not without a dysgenic after-effect. The very
fact that recognition is attainable by all, means that democracy leads
to social ambition; and social ambition leads to smaller families. This
influence is manifested mainly in the women, whose desire to climb the
social ladder is increased by the ease of ascent which is due to lack of
rigid social barriers. But while ascent is possible for almost anyone,
it is naturally favored by freedom from handicaps, such as a large
family of children. In the "successful" business and professional
classes, therefore, there is an inducement to the wife to limit the
number of her offspring, in order that she may have more time to devote
to social "duties." In a country like Germany, with more or less
stratified social classes, this factor in the differential birth-rate
is probably less operative. The solution in America is not to create an
impermeable social stratification, but to create a public sentiment
which will honor women more for motherhood than for eminence in the
largely futile activities of polite society.

In quite another way, too great democratization of a country is
dangerous. The tendency is to ask, in regard to any measure, "What do
the people want?" while the question should be "What ought the people to
want?" The _vox populi_ may and often does want something that is in the
long run quite detrimental to the welfare of the state. The ultimate
test of a state is whether it is strong enough to survive, and a measure
that all the people, or a voting majority of them (which is the
significant thing in a democracy), want, may be such as to handicap the
state severely.

In general, experts are better able to decide what measures will be
desirable in the long run, than are voters of the general population,
most of whom know little about the real merits of many of the most
important projects. Yet democracies have a tendency to scorn the advice
of experts, most of the voters feeling that they are as good as any one
else, and that their opinion is entitled to as much weight as that of
the expert. This attitude naturally makes it difficult to secure the
passage of measures which are eugenic or otherwise beneficial in
character