,
more strictly, unreal, false.
There are no similar difficulties in the way of Ramanuja's
interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees with /S/a@nkara in the
explanation of Sutras 19-35, with this difference that he views them as
setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddhanta. Sutras 26-28 also
are interpreted in a manner not very different from /S/a@nkara's,
special stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture between
knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as a knowing agent, the
substratum of knowledge. This discussion naturally gives rise to the
question how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of the term
vij/n/ana when meaning the individual soul. The answer is given in Sutra
29, 'The soul is designated as knowledge because it has that quality for
its essence,' i.e. because knowledge is the essential characteristic
quality of the soul, therefore the term 'knowledge' is employed here and
there to denote the soul itself. This latter interpretation gives rise
to no doubt whatever. It closely follows the wording of the text and
does not necessitate any forced supplementation. The 'tu' of the Sutra
which, according to /S/a@nkara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha,
serves on Ramanuja's view to set aside a previously-raised objection; an
altogether legitimate assumption.
Of the three remaining Sutras of the adhikara/n/a (30-32), 30 explains,
according to /S/a@nkara, that the soul may be called a/n/u, since, as
long as it exists in the sa/m/sara condition, it is connected with the
buddhi. According to Ramanuja the Sutra teaches that the soul may be
called vij/n/ana because the latter constitutes its essential quality as
long as it exists.--Sutra 31 intimates, according to /S/a@nkara, that in
the states of deep sleep, and so on, the soul is potentially connected
with the buddhi, while in the waking state that connexion becomes
actually manifest. The same Sutra, according to Ramanuja, teaches that
j/n/at/ri/tva is properly said to constitute the soul's essential
nature, although it is actually manifested in some states of the soul
only.--In Sutra 32, finally, /S/a@nkara sees a statement of the doctrine
that, unless the soul had the buddhi for its limiting adjunct, it would
either be permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing; while,
according to Ramanuja, the Sutra means that the soul would either be
permanently cognizing or permanently non-cognizing, if it were pure
knowledge and
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