soul is of minute size; the
Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it;
while the Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra
18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/n/at/ri/) stands
to knowledge (j/n/ana).--In order to decide between the conflicting
claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some
details.--/S/a@nkara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a
purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29. What here strikes us
at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere
prima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much
trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and
an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28
we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to
be abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and
vindicate an essential dogma of the system. Still it is not altogether
impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length
than usual, and the decisive point is therefore whether we can, with
/S/a@nkara, look upon Sutra 29 as embodying a refutation of the
purvapaksha and thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the
individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think there can be no doubt that
/S/a@nkara's interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced.
Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential word
'praj/n/avat') the Sutra runs as follows: 'But on account of that
quality (or "those qualities;" or else "on account of the quality--or
qualities--of that") being the essence, (there is) that designation (or
"the designation of that").' This /S/a@nkara maintains to mean, 'Because
the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the soul in the sa/m/sara
state, therefore the soul itself is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.' Now,
in the first place, nothing in the context warrants the explanation of
the first 'tat' by buddhi. And--which is more important--in the second
place, it is more than doubtful whether on /S/a@nkara's own system the
qualities of the buddhi--such as pleasure, pain, desire, aversion,
&c.--can with any propriety be said to constitute the essence of the
soul even in the sa/m/sara state. The essence of the soul in whatever
state, according to /S/a@nkara's system, is knowledge or intelligence;
whatever is due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential or