had been printed with the
permission of another bishop. So earnestly bent was the King at that
time on pressing his claim to override the necessity of a
parliamentary grant in moments of emergency.

He had now however retreated from this position. Abbot had obtained
permission to resume his seat in the Upper House, and so had Lord
Bristol. When, in consequence of the above-mentioned declaration in
Parliament, a project was now decided on for securing the legal
position of the subject, especially the rights of property and
personal freedom, which had been infringed by the previous
proceedings, the King expressed his agreement loudly, explicitly, and
repeatedly; in general terms he gave up his claim ever to proceed
again to a forced loan. No one was ever to be arrested again because
he would not lend money; and in all other cases where arrest was
necessary the customary forms were to be observed.

At this point however another question arose touching the very essence
of the supreme power. The Lower House was not yet content that an
abuse like that which had occurred should be merely removed: it wished
to destroy it at the root. It was not satisfied with the promise of
the King that he would never in any case punish by arrest, unless he
was convinced in his conscience of its necessity. They wished to put
an end to this discretionary power itself, of which his ministers
could avail themselves at pleasure. Parliament demanded that
henceforth no one should be arrested without assignment of the reason
and observance of the forms of law.

This question led to a discussion of points of constitutional doctrine
before the House of Lords, between the representatives of the Lower
House and Sir Robert Heath, the Attorney General, in an argument which
deserves our whole attention.

The Lower House appealed to that article of Magna Charta, by which the
arrest of free persons was forbidden except on the judgment of their
peers, or according to the law of the land: and by the law of the land
it understood the judicial process and its forms. Sir Robert Heath
would not admit this interpretation. He thought that the expression in
no way forbade the King to restrict the liberty of individuals in
extraordinary cases for reasons of state; and that this restriction
could not be avoided, when it was desired to trace out some conspiracy
or treason. If the cause were to be assigned he thought that it must
be the real cause, which could be pr