oved before a tribunal; but how
often cases arose of such a kind that arrest would have to be ordered
under some other pretext, until the ring-leader could be laid hold of!
It was very true, he said, that such a power might be seriously
abused, but it was the same with all the rights of the prerogative:
even the right of making war and peace, and the right of pardon might
be abused, and yet no man wished to take these from the crown: it
always was, and must always be presumed, that the King would not
betray the confidence of God, who had placed him in his office.

Not without good reason did Edward Coke call this the greatest
question which had ever been argued in Westminster. It was proved to
him that he himself as judge had followed the interpretation which he
now condemned. He answered that he was not pope, and made no
pretensions to infallibility. He now firmly maintained that the King
had no such prerogative at all.

We can see how opinion wavered from a speech of Sir Benjamin Rudyard,
who maintains on the one hand that it is impossible to find laws
beforehand for every case, but that a circle must be drawn within
which the royal authority shall prevail; while on the other hand he
lays emphasis also on the danger arising from the plea of mere reasons
of state, which he said would only too easily come into conflict with
the laws and with religion itself. The best arrangement according to
him would be, if Parliament were held so often that the irregular
power which could not be broken at once, might by degrees 'moulder
away.' A copy of this speech with observations by Laud is extant in
the archives. Laud calls attention to the contradiction which lies in
first acknowledging the necessity of liberty of movement on the part
of the government, and then notwithstanding considering it to be the
destination of Parliament by degrees to absorb its power, as it was at
present exercised.[475]

And certainly it may have been the idea of the moderate members of
the House of Commons, gradually to break up such a power as that
exercised by the minister and favourite, by coming to a better
understanding with the King, and at the same time by strictly limiting
his arbitrary authority.

The impression however gained ground that even the indispensable
functions of the supreme authority would be restricted by the
enactments proposed. The right of arresting persons dangerous and
troublesome to the government was just then exercised