he had
the right of ordering the arrest of his subjects without specifying
the reason at the same time. On this the Judges were assembled by
their two chiefs in the profoundest secrecy, to pronounce on the
question. They decided that it certainly was the rule to specify the
reasons; but that there might be cases in which the secrecy required
made it necessary for some time to withhold them. A further question
was then followed by a decision of the same import, that the judges in
such a case were not bound to give up the prisoner even if a writ of
habeas corpus were presented. Charles then proceeded to a third
question, to which no doubt he attached the most importance. If he
accepted the petition of the Commons, did he surrender for ever the
right of ordering imprisonment without assigning a cause? The judges
assembled again, and on the 31st of May, after deliberating together,
they gave in their answer, signed with their names. Every law, they
said, had its own interpretation; and so must this petition: and the
answer must always depend upon the circumstances of the case in
question, which could not be determined until the case arose; but the
King certainly did not give up his right beforehand by granting the
petition.[476]

At a later time and in another epoch these questions were finally
settled in a different way. The Judges of this time decided them in
favour of the power of the time. If we might apply a parallel, though
certainly one borrowed from a very different form of government, we
might say that the fettah of men learned in the law, the sentence of
the mufti, was in favour of the King. In this, as in other respects, a
difference is found to exist between the constitutions of the East and
those of the West: such a sentence in the West does not finally decide
a case; but even here, nevertheless, it always carries great weight.
Charles I felt that according to the existing state of the law, he did
not exceed his rights by maintaining the prerogative which he had
hitherto exercised. The last decision raised him even above the
apprehension of losing it by acceding to a petition which was opposed
to it.

He could not however resolve on this step without further
consideration.

To accede to the petition, and at the same time to reserve in his own
favour the declaration made by the Judges, was an act of duplicity,
which he wished to escape by giving an assurance couched in general
terms.

On the 2nd of June