to on the ground that it would admit all
the works named to be read, and as Crandall had not been proved to be
a member of that Society, he ought not to be made answerable for all
their doings, nor for all that the editor of the Emancipator might see
fit to publish.

_The Court_ decided that the reading must be confined within some
reasonable limits. That the District Attorney might read such _editorial_
articles, or parts of them, as he saw fit, and the counsel for the
defence might read any other parts, or the whole, if they chose. The
advertisement was of course rejected, but reading of other parts was
continued.

_The District Attorney_ afterwards offered evidence, under the third
count of the indictment, to put in certain tracts with pictures upon
them, which was objected to upon two grounds. _First_, that the count
was insufficient, as it did not specify any libellous publication and
did not declare that the offence was against any person, or government,
or people, which was said to be an essential form of indictment; and,
_second_, because the whole of the tracts, papers, and pamphlets, were
illegally obtained from the prisoner.

The defendant's counsel then read the warrant under which Crandall was
apprehended, which authorized the officers to take the person of the
prisoner, and to search his papers; and contended that such search
warrant was illegal--that a man's private papers were sacred from
search.

The objection was resisted on the ground that the objection was made too
late. It should have been taken at the outset of the trial, or before
the magistrates--that the warrant (which was admitted to have been made
by the District Attorney) was proper, and conformable to the law which
admitted of search in the premises and in the persons of thieves and
counterfeiters for the tools and implements with which they were enabled
to commit their crime--and that it was competent to use the evidence
which had been obtained, although it was illegally gotten in the first
instance.

_The Court_ was of opinion that the evidence was competent, on the
principle upon which evidence might be given of stolen goods found in
consequence of confession, though the confession might be forced from
the prisoner by threats or evil treatment. The confession might not be
evidence, but the fact of finding the stolen goods could be proved to
the jury.

_The Court_ also overruled the objection to the form of the count, and
did not