the proof will be thrown into the _circulus in probando_,
for the truth of each rests on the other.[5]
[1] _Hyp._ I. 100.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 104.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 100.
[4] _Hyp._ I. 112.
[5] _Hyp._ I. 117.
Diogenes gives in part the same illustrations of this Trope, but
in a much more condensed form. The marked characteristic of this
train of reasoning is the attempt to prove that abnormal
conditions are also natural. In referring at first to the
opposing states of body and mind, which so change the character
of sense-perception, Sextus classifies them according to the
popular usage as [Greek: kata physin] and [Greek: para physin].
This distinction was an important one, even with Aristotle, and
was especially developed by the Stoics[1] in a broader sense
than referring merely to health and sickness. The Stoics,
however, considered only normal conditions as being according to
nature. Sextus, on the contrary, declares that abnormal states
are also conditions according to nature,[2] and just as those
who are in health are in a state that is natural to those who
are in health, so also those not in health are in a state that
is natural to those not in health, and in some respects
according to nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are not
absolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really exists
for those who are asleep as the things that exist in waking
exist, although they do not exist in sleep.[3] One mental
representation, therefore, cannot be judged by another, which is
also in a state of relation to existing physical and mental
conditions. Diogenes states this principle even more decidedly
in his exposition of this Trope. "The insane are not in a
condition opposed to nature; why they more than we? For we also
see the sun as if it were stationary."[4] Furthermore, in
different periods of life ideas differ. Children are fond of
balls and hoops, while those in their prime prefer other things,
and the aged still others.[5] The wisdom contained in this Trope
in reference to the relative value of the things most sought
after is not original with Sextus, but is found in the more
earnest ethical teachings of older writers. Sextus does not,
however, draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning, but
only uses it as an argument for [Greek: epoche].
[1] Diog. VII. 1, 86.
[2] _Hyp._ I. 103.
[3] _Hyp._ I. 104.
[4] Diog. IX. 11, 82.
[5] _Hyp._ I. 106.
_The F
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