all present
the negative side of Pyrrhonism. The vast array of arguments
comprising the subject-matter, often repeated in the same and
different forms, are evidently taken largely from the Sceptical
works which Sextus had resource to, and are, in fact, a summing
up of all the wisdom of the Sceptical School. The style of these
books is fluent, and the Greek reminds one of Plutarch and
Thucydides, and although Sextus does not claim originality, but
presents in all cases the arguments of the Sceptic, yet the
illustrations and the form in which the arguments are presented,
often bear the marks of his own thought, and are characterized
here and there by a wealth of humor that has not been
sufficiently noticed in the critical works on Sextus. Of all the
authors who have reviewed Sextus, Brochard is the only one who
seems to have understood and appreciated his humorous side.
We shall now proceed to the consideration of the general
position and aim of Pyrrhonism.
[1] Diog. IX. 12, 116.
CHAPTER II.
_The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism_.
The first volume of the _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_ gives the most
complete statement found in any of the works of Sextus Empiricus
of the teachings of Pyrrhonism and its relation to other schools
of philosophy. The chief source of the subject-matter presented
is a work of the same name by Aenesidemus,[1] either directly
used by Sextus, or through the writings of those who followed
Aenesidemus. The comprehensive title [Greek: Purrhoneioi
hupotuposeis] was very probably used in general to designate
courses of lectures given by the leaders of the Sceptical
School.
In the opening chapters of the _Hypotyposes_ Sextus undertakes
to define the position and aim of Pyrrhonism.[2] In introducing
his subject he treats briefly of the differences between
philosophical schools, dividing them into three classes; those
which claim that they have found the truth, like the schools of
Aristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny the
possibility of finding it, like that of the Academicians; and
those that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. The
accusation against the Academicians, that they denied the
possibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptics were
very fond of making. We shall discuss the justice of it later,
simply remarking here, that to affirm the "incomprehensibility
of the unknown," was a form of expression that the Pyrrhonists
themselves were sometimes
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