iters have mainly attempted to solve the problem by the
principle of differentiation of function. This will certainly help us in
considering the relation of church and state. For we can say that the
task of the political organization is to maintain the conditions of the
good life, leaving the work of developing the meaning of the good life,
the fostering and inculcation of ideals, to voluntary associations. The
state will then maintain a certain minimum of moral behaviour, while the
more delicate and freer work of inspiration is left to individuals and
voluntary associations. This will not always provide a clean-cut and
sufficient differentiation. The state must make up its own mind what is
essential to the maintenance of the good life, the voluntary
associations may hold that what the state ordains is flatly evil, as the
state may hold that what a voluntary association teaches is subversive
of all that makes a common ordered life possible, and both must be true
to the facts as they see them. When such conflict arises, as it has
arisen lately, if the only answer we can give at present is the old
answer given by Dr. Johnson, 'The state had a right to martyr the Early
Christians, and they had a right to be martyred,' yet at least we are
farther on if each side honestly recognizes the importance of the work
that the other has to do.
When we come to the problem raised by the present position and claims of
Trade Unions, differentiation of functions is less satisfactory. Let us
first look at the problem as it confronts us to-day. There was a time
when the state was doubtful whether it should allow trade unions to
exist. The Political Economy prevalent in the earlier part of the
nineteenth century taught that trade unions were either unnecessary or
useless--unnecessary in so far as economic relations, if unhindered by
regulations from the state or from combinations, were regarded by
economic optimism as themselves producing satisfactory social
conditions; useless where Political Economy had substituted for optimism
a belief in 'iron laws' whose results no combination or government
regulation could affect. We now see that economic relations, just
because they are possible between men who have no common purpose, need
regulation inspired by a common purpose, and can be affected by such
regulation. The growth of governmental interference with industry and of
trade unionism are part of the same movement to control the working of
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