at spirit, suffer a relapse. Despite the entreaties of his
generals, he had retreated after Eylau; and now, after a day of
inaction, his columns filed off towards Koenigsberg under cover of the
darkness. In excuse for this action it has been urged that he had but
two days' supply of bread in the camp, and that a forward move of
Davoust's corps round his right flank threatened to cut him off from
his base of supplies, Koenigsberg.[130]

The first excuse only exposes him to greater censure. The Russian
habit at that time usually was to live almost from hand to mouth; but
that a carefully-prepared position like that of Heilsberg should be
left without adequate supplies is unpardonable. On the two next days
the rival hosts marched northward, the one to seize, the other to
save, Koenigsberg. They were separated by the winding vale of the Alle.
But the course of this river favoured Napoleon as much as it hindered
Bennigsen. The Alle below Heilsberg makes a deep bend towards the
north-east, then northwards again towards Friedland, where it comes
within forty miles of Koenigsberg, but in its lower course flows
north-east until it joins the Pregel.

An army marching from Heilsberg to the old Prussian capital by the
right bank would therefore easily be outstripped by one that could
follow the chord of the arc instead of the irregular arc itself.
Napoleon was in this fortunate position, while the Russians plodded
amid heavy rains over the semicircular route further to the east.
Their mistake in abandoning Heilsberg was now obvious. The Emperor
halted at Eylau on the 13th for news of the Prussians in front and of
Bennigsen on his right flank. Against the former he hurled his chief
masses under the lead of Murat in the hope of seizing Koenigsberg at
one blow.[131] But, foreseeing that the Russians would probably pass
over the Alle at Friedland he despatched Lannes to Domnau to see
whether they had already crossed in force. Clearly, then, Napoleon did
not foresee what the morrow had in store for him: his aim was to drive
a solid wedge between Bennigsen and the defenders of Koenigsberg, to
storm that city first, and then to turn on Bennigsen. The claim of
some of Napoleon's admirers that he laid a trap for the Russians at
Friedland, as he had done at Austerlitz, is therefore refuted by the
Emperor's own orders.

None the less did Bennigsen walk into a trap, and one of his own
choosing. Anxious to thrust himself between Napoleon and