h France intended
to negotiate," and secondly what were the secret articles of the
Treaty of Tilsit. That there were such was obvious; for the published
treaty made no mention of the Kings of Sardinia and of the two
Sicilies, in whom Alexander had taken so deep an interest. But the
second request annoyed the Czar; and this feeling was intensified by
our action at Copenhagen. Yet, though he pronounced it an act of
"unheard-of violence," the Russian official notes to our Government
were so far reassuring that Lord Castlereagh was able to write to Lord
Cathcart (September 22nd): "Russia does not show any disposition to
resent or to complain of what we have done at Copenhagen.... The tone
of the Russian cabinet has become much more conciliatory to us since
they heard of your operations at Copenhagen."[166] It would seem,
however, that this double-dealing was prompted by naval
considerations. The Czar desired to temporize until his Mediterranean
squadron should gain a place of safety and his Baltic ports be encased
in ice; but on 27th October (8th November, N.S.) he broke off all
communications with us, and adopted the Continental System.

Meanwhile, at the other extremity of Europe, events were transpiring
that served as the best excuse for our harshness towards Denmark. Even
before our fleet sailed for the Sound, Napoleon was weaving his plans
for the destruction of Portugal. It is clear that he designed to
strike her first before taking any action against Denmark. During his
return journey from Tilsit to Paris, he directed Talleyrand to send
orders to Lisbon for the closing of all Portuguese ports against
British goods by September the 1st--"in default of which I declare war
on Portugal." He also ordered the massing of 20,000 French troops at
Bayonne in readiness to join the Spanish forces that were to threaten
the little kingdom.[167]

What crime had Portugal committed? She had of late been singularly
passive: anxiously she looked on at the gigantic strifes that were
engulfing the smaller States one by one. Her conduct towards Napoleon
had been far less provocative than that of Denmark towards England.
Threatened with partition by him and Spain in 1801, she had eagerly
snatched at peace, and on the rupture of the Peace of Amiens was fain
to purchase her neutrality at the cost of a heavy subsidy to France,
which she still paid in the hope of prolonging her "existence on
sufferance."[168] That hope now faded away.

As